Difference between revisions of "Social Dilemmas"

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''Choices players need to make that either set their own individual gains against each others or against the gains of a social group they belong to.''
''Choice players need to make that either set their own individual gains against each others or against the gains of a social group they belong to.''
+
  
 
Games where players belong to teams, alliances, or other types of groups that are supposed to cooperate can cause problems for those players because they might exist actions that would benefit them individual but harm the larger group.
 
Games where players belong to teams, alliances, or other types of groups that are supposed to cooperate can cause problems for those players because they might exist actions that would benefit them individual but harm the larger group.
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=== Examples ===
 
=== Examples ===
[[Republic of Rome]]
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[[Social Dilemmas]] have been the focus of several board and card games. In [[The Republic of Rome]], players compete against each other to have the largest faction in the Rome, but at the same time have to stop barbarians from invading the empire. In [[Intrigue]] and [[So Long Sucker]] players do not have to cooperate but they game mechanics force them to entry alliances and pacts to be able to perform actions, and [[Intrigue]] is balanced so they are likely to have and break deals later.
[[Intrigue]]  
+
[[So Long Sucker]]
+
  
 
== Using the pattern ==
 
== Using the pattern ==
[[Guilds]]
+
Creating [[Social Dilemmas]] consist creating [[Incompatible Goals]] that pair [[Individual Rewards]] or [[Individual Penalties|Penalties]] against [[Shared Rewards]] or [[Shared Penalties|Penalties]] - this often takes the form of [[Asynchronous Collaborative Actions]]. These are often combined with [[Risk/Reward]], [[Imperfect Information]], and [[Delayed Effects]] to add [[Tension]] by postponing or making it more difficult or impossible to notice how other players have acted.
[[Inherent Mistrust]]
+
  
 +
Quite obviously games that are supposed to have [[Social Dilemmas]] need to have others populating the social groups; this provides a way to change the relations between players in [[Multiplayer Games]] but can also be designed for players by using [[Factions]] with [[Non-Player Characters]]. There are several well-known basic types of [[Social Dilemmas]]: [[Delayed Reciprocity]] (see for example [[Intrigue]] and [[So Long Sucker]]), the ''Prisoners' Dilemma'', and the [[Tragedy of the Commons]].
  
Creating [[Social Dilemmas]] consist creating [[Incompatible Goals]] that pair [[Individual Rewards]] or [[Individual Penalties|Penalties]] against [[Shared Rewards]], or [[Shared Penalties|Penalties]]. These are often combined with [[Risk/Reward]], [[Imperfect Information]], and [[Delayed Effects]] to add [[Tension]] by postponing or making it more difficult or impossible to notice how other players have acted.
+
The ''Prisoners' Dilemma'' is the classic example used in game theory and its name comes from the fictional situation of two prisoners accused of conspiring in two crimes, one minor crime for which their guilt can be proven without any confession, and a major crime for which the guilt can be proven only with one or more confessions. The prosecutor gives both prisoners the same deal: if both confess (which can be seen as an example of [[Betrayal]]), they both go to jail for five years (a [[Shared Penalties|Shared Penalty]]); if only one of them confesses, he goes free and the other goes to jail for 10 years (a [[Individual Rewards|Individual Reward]] and [[Individual Penalties|Individual Penalty]] respectively). Finally, if both refuse to confess, they both go to jail for one year (also a [[Shared Penalties|Shared Penalty]]). The core of the dilemma is that even though the option where both prisoners refuse to confess is better for them, for each of them there is a risk that the other will confess, and playing it safe by confessing leads to a situation where both prisoners end up in jail for five years. The design of Prisoner's Dilemma is shows how players can be tempted to not accept a certain [[Shared Penalties|Shared Penalty]] for the possibility of an [[Individual Rewards|Individual Reward]] but can also receive an [[Individual Penalties|Individual Penalty]] for misplacing trust in another player. If both confess, they receive a worse [[Shared Penalties|Shared Penalty]] than if they cooperated and this makes the choice one of [[Risk/Reward]]. The original Prisoners' Dilemma did not allow communication between the prisoners before making the choice. Allowing [[Communication Channels]] complicates the situation, and introduces [[Negotiation]], but the issue of trust and thus the [[Social Dilemmas|Social Dilemma]], still remains.
  
There are two well-known basic types of [[Social Dilemmas]], the The Prisoners' Dilemma and The Tragedy of the Commons.
+
The ''Tragedy of the Commons''<ref name="Hardin"/> revolves around avoiding [[Shared Penalties]] of having [[Renewable Resources|Renewable]] and [[Shared Resources]] from being overused and thereby becoming depleted. These [[Continuous Goals]] become dilemmas when players either cannot stop each other from consuming the resources or may not notice the consumption. The name stems from the case where a pasture is free to use for all herdsmen of a village but where over-herding would diminish its future capacity.  
  
The Prisoners' Dilemma is the classic example used in game theory. The dilemma's name comes from the fictional situation of two prisoners accused of conspiring in two crimes, one minor crime for which their guilt can be proven without any confession, and a major crime for which the guilt can be proven only with one or more confessions. The prosecutor gives both prisoners the same deal: if both confess (which can be seen as an example of [[Betrayal]]), they both go to jail for five years (a [[Shared Penalties|Shared Penalty]]); if only one of them confesses, he goes free and the other goes to jail for 10 years (a [[Individual Rewards|Individual Reward]] and [[Individual Penalties|Individual Penalty]] respectively). Finally, if both refuse to confess, they both go to jail for one year (also a [[Shared Penalties|Shared Penalty]]). The core of the dilemma is that even though the option where both prisoners refuse to confess is better for them, for each of them there is a risk that the other will confess, and playing it safe by confessing leads to a situation where both prisoners end up in jail for five years. The design of Prisoner's Dilemma is shows how players can be tempted to not accept a certain [[Shared Penalties|Shared Penalty]] for the possibility of an [[Individual Rewards|Individual Reward]] but can also receive an [[Individual Penalties|Individual Penalty]] for misplacing trust in another player. If both confess, they receive a worse [[Shared Penalties|Shared Penalty]] than if they cooperated and this makes the choice one of [[Risk/Reward]]. The original Prisoners' Dilemma did not allow communication between the prisoners before making the choice. Allowing [[Communication Channels]] complicates the situation, and introduces [[Negotiation]], but the issue of trust and thus the Social Dilemma, still remains.
+
The construction of the social group that helps define the [[Social Dilemmas]] can be done in a couple of different ways. Although the reason for having [[Shared Penalties]] can be arbitrary in games having [[Social Dilemmas]] as the core gameplay mechanic, in others the use of [[Teams]] can lessen the will for egoistic actions. Games where [[Beat the Leader]] opportunities appear create ephemeral [[Social Dilemmas]] in if one should spend efforts against the current leader which benefits all other players or if one should focus on bettering one's own position and hope others will work against the leader instead. Other social groups may rely on [[Delayed Reciprocity]], e.g. [[Guilds]], and thereby have [[Social Dilemmas]] inherent in their structures. By making the [[Social Dilemmas]] not resolvable in one step, as in the case of managing [[Shared Resources]], the dilemmas themselves create the basis for social groups as these are needed to handle what in practice are [[Continuous Goals]]. For any grouping that can make players have a sense of [[Loyalty]], [[Social Dilemmas]] can be added by introducing [[Internal Rivalry]]. [[The Republic of Rome]] shows how [[Internal Rivalry]] can be combined with [[Mutual Enemies]] to create [[Social Dilemmas]] as well. Another option is combining [[Internal Rivalry]] with [[Mutual Goals]].
  
 +
While [[Social Dilemmas]] can work with abstract social groups, as for example a discussion of ''Tragedy of the Commons'' concerning fishing rights don't need to provide details about individual fishermen to make sense, providing details about individuals affects by the [[Social Dilemmas]] (e.g., by making these individuals as [[Characters]] or [[Non-Player Characters]]) can make players engage in [[Perspective Taking]] and open up for them have more [[Emotional Engrossment]] in the [[Social Dilemmas]].
  
 
+
Both [[Tied Results]] and [[Tiebreakers]] can be used to create [[Social Dilemmas]]; [[Tied Results]] allows players to have to share [[Rewards]] or not be given them at all when ties occur ([[Las Vegas]] is an example of this rule but only creates weak [[Social Dilemmas]] since the social groups are not explicit). [[Tiebreakers]] can in contrast make it impossible to share [[Rewards]] or [[Penalties]] even when players want to. Which of these two patterns are appropriate for a specific design however depends on the other factors related to the [[Rewards]], [[Penalties]], and how one can win the game.  
The Tragedy of the Commons<ref name="Hardin"/> describes a situation where the pasture is free to use for all herdsmen of the village but where the overherding will in the end diminish the capacity of the common pasture. The dilemma arises because the benefits for each herdsman of increasing his flock of cattle is individual but the penalties of overherding are shared between all the herdsmen, and this will usually lead to a situation where overherding will result in the collapse of the whole herding business.
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+
 
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Designing Social Dilemmas requires designing actions with Individual Rewards for the player who performs the action but with Shared Penalties to the other players. If the Penalties are perceived as Individual Penalties or the game state can make the Penalties only affect one player, the actions are not guaranteed to be Social Dilemmas. An example is when players have agreed to accept Tied Results but one player can perform actions leading to that player receiving all the Rewards; in this case, the dilemma is either due to the chance of gaining more Rewards than otherwise or due to making the other players received the Penalties of not receiving the anticipated Rewards. Another example is Social Organizations where the main Penalty may be social rejection and the Reward is to be able to spend time and effort on other activities. A third is Enemies that are Enemies due to misunderstandings that the players are aware of.
+
 
+
 
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[[Character Defining Actions]]
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[[Internal Conflicts]]
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[[Loyalty]]
+
 
+
[[Time Limits]]
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[[Betrayal]]
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[[Cooperation]]
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[[Rerolls]]
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[[Freedom of Choice]]
+
[[Multiplayer Games]]
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[[Factions]]
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[[Internal Rivalry]]
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[[Delayed Reciprocity]]
+
 
+
 
+
 
+
 
+
When using Social Dilemma in the game, one has to consider what kinds of methods for Social Interaction there are in the game, as most uses of Social Dilemma require that players have to negotiate with other players.
+
 
+
Situations similar to The Prisoners' Dilemma arise when there at least two players who are dependant upon the Cooperation between the players. If Cooperation is sustained without Betrayal, all the participating players progress quite well in the game. The crux of the dilemma is that the first player to stop the Cooperation receives a large pay-off at the expense of those players who are still cooperating, and if all players stop the Cooperation, all players do worse than when cooperating. To work well, the Prisoners' Dilemma requires Delayed Effects of some kind from the actions that determine Cooperation, as this will create more Tension between the players.
+
 
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The Tragedy of the Commons requires that there is a Renewable and Shared Resource, which has an upper limit for the renewal rate, and that initially the use of the resource is potentially unlimited for each participating player. Of course, the use of this resource should lead to something the players perceive as a reward. One common method, and also true to the original dilemma, is to use a Converter to create higher level Individual Rewards for the players. For example, a player belonging to an Alliance in a military strategy game can use the shared cities to create troops for himself.
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=== Diegetic Aspects ===
 
=== Diegetic Aspects ===
 +
[[Character Alignments]] can be used to motivate and thematize [[Social Dilemmas]] when the agents which are to have these [[Social Dilemmas]] are at least partly defined by said [[Character Alignments]].
  
 
=== Interface Aspects ===
 
=== Interface Aspects ===
 +
The way players treat [[Social Dilemmas]] can be influenced by what type of [[Social Interaction]] they can have with each other. This makes it possible to modulate their behavior by providing [[Communication Channels]], hindering [[Unmediated Social Interaction]] or having [[Enforced Player Anonymity]].
  
 
=== Narrative Aspects ===
 
=== Narrative Aspects ===
 +
When [[Social Dilemmas]] depict [[Characters]] actions rather than players', they can easily become important events in the [[Narration Structures]] or [[Predetermined Story Structures]] as [[Character Defining Actions]].
  
 
== Consequences ==
 
== Consequences ==
[[Social Dilemmas]] give players a [[Freedom of Choice]] to do actions for egoistic or utilitarian reasons - but these may be influenced by [[Guilting]] evoked by the relations the players' have to the other players' affected.
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[[Social Dilemmas]] give players a [[Freedom of Choice]] to do actions for egoistic or utilitarian reasons - but these may be influenced by [[Guilting]] evoked by the relations the players' have to the other players' affected. Since performing some of the actions possible in [[Social Dilemmas]] are likely to cause animosity from other players, these situations can create [[Internal Conflicts]] and [[Tension]] and well as [[Emotional Engrossment]]; this is likely to make the player suffering from the [[Social Dilemmas|Social Dilemma]] have to choose an explicit [[Social Roles|Social Role]]. When players are aware of other players' [[Social Dilemmas]], even if they only potentially are dilemmas, this affects these players' [[Perceived Chance to Succeed]] as well as create [[Risk/Reward]] situations for them due to [[Inherent Mistrust]]. The possibilities for [[Tension]] and [[Inherent Mistrust]] makes [[Social Dilemmas]] problematic to combine with [[Casual Gameplay]]. When players resolve [[Social Dilemmas]] so they do not directly benefit themselves comparably with others, this may be regarded as examples of [[Altruistic Actions]] even when they are actually [[No-Ops]].
  
Since performing the actions is likely to cause animosity from other players, Social Dilemmas can create Emotional Immersion for all partners involved. When other players are aware of a player's Social Dilemma, even if it is only potentially a dilemma, this affects these players' Perceived Chance to Succeed with actions as well as their Risk/Reward choices.
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When other players are aware of dilemmas and they have [[Communication Channels]] to those having the dilemmas, it is quite natural for [[Negotiation]] and [[Social Interaction]] to occur. This may also support the rise of [[Cooperation]], [[Dynamic Alliances]], and [[Social Organizations]] when the [[Social Dilemmas]] are not resolved immediately due to being part of [[Continuous Goals]], e.g. managing [[Shared Resources]] as in common in the ''Tragedy of the Commons'' case.
  
The case of The Tragedy of the Commons where the players are able to communicate with each other, but also able to perceive that the consumption rate of the Shared Resource is higher than the renewal rate, seems in most cases to lead to a situation where Social Organizations arise spontaneously or Resources become depleted. Shared Resources and the possibility of communication by themselves support Social Interaction, of course, but this kind of dilemma situation can increase it even more. The situation at least in the first phases and without strong outside threat, will also lead to dynamics of Cooperation and Competition within the group in the form of Dynamic Alliances. It is probable that the introduction of an outside threat in this phase will stabilize the group into a Social Organization.
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[[Betrayal]] can occur in several ways when [[Social Dilemmas]] exist: choosing [[Individual Rewards]] over [[Shared Rewards]], making others receive [[Penalties]] while avoiding them oneself, or failing to fulfill obligations related to [[Delayed Reciprocity]].
  
[[Altruistic Actions]]
+
Since [[Social Dilemmas]] exists both as part of gameplay and in other situations, providing it in gameplay can quite easily point to similar cases in other contexts and through this [[Social Dilemmas]] offers a basis for [[Critical Gameplay Design]].
 
+
[[Tension]]
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[[Risk/Reward]]
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[[Negotiation]]
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== Relations ==
 
== Relations ==
 
=== Can Instantiate ===
 
=== Can Instantiate ===
 +
[[Altruistic Actions]],
 +
[[Betrayal]],
 +
[[Critical Gameplay Design]],
 +
[[Dynamic Alliances]],
 +
[[Emotional Engrossment]],
 
[[Freedom of Choice]],  
 
[[Freedom of Choice]],  
 
[[Guilting]],  
 
[[Guilting]],  
 +
[[Inherent Mistrust]],
 +
[[Internal Conflicts]],
 +
[[Negotiation]],
 +
[[Predetermined Story Structures]],
 
[[Risk/Reward]],  
 
[[Risk/Reward]],  
 +
[[Social Roles]],
 
[[Tension]]
 
[[Tension]]
  
==== with [[Communication Channels]] ====
+
==== with [[Characters]] ====
[[Negotiation]]
+
[[Character Defining Actions]]
 +
 
 +
==== with [[Communication Channels]] or [[Unmediated Social Interaction]] ====
 +
[[Negotiation]],
 +
[[Social Interaction]]
 +
 
 +
==== with [[Continuous Goals]] and [[Negotiation]] ====
 +
[[Cooperation]], [[Dynamic Alliances]], [[Social Organizations]]  
  
 
=== Can Modulate ===
 
=== Can Modulate ===
 +
[[Multiplayer Games]],
 +
[[Narration Structures]],
 +
[[Perceived Chance to Succeed]]
  
 
=== Can Be Instantiated By ===
 
=== Can Be Instantiated By ===
 +
[[Asynchronous Collaborative Actions]],
 +
[[Beat the Leader]],
 +
[[Character Alignments]],
 
[[Collaborative Actions]],  
 
[[Collaborative Actions]],  
 +
[[Delayed Reciprocity]],
 +
[[Factions]],
 +
[[Guilds]],
 
[[Incompatible Goals]],  
 
[[Incompatible Goals]],  
 
[[Individual Penalties]],  
 
[[Individual Penalties]],  
 
[[Individual Rewards]],  
 
[[Individual Rewards]],  
 
[[Shared Penalties]],  
 
[[Shared Penalties]],  
[[Shared Rewards]]
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[[Shared Resources]],
 +
[[Shared Rewards]],
 +
[[Renewable Resources]],
 +
[[Tiebreakers]],
 +
[[Tied Results]],
 +
[[Tragedy of the Commons]]
  
 +
[[Internal Rivalry]] together with [[Loyalty]] or [[Mutual Enemies]] or [[Mutual Goals]]
  
 
=== Can Be Modulated By ===
 
=== Can Be Modulated By ===
 
[[Communication Channels]],  
 
[[Communication Channels]],  
 +
[[Continuous Goals]],
 
[[Delayed Effects]],  
 
[[Delayed Effects]],  
 
[[Imperfect Information]],  
 
[[Imperfect Information]],  
[[Risk/Reward]]
+
[[No-Ops]],
 +
[[Enforced Player Anonymity]],
 +
[[Perspective Taking]],
 +
[[Risk/Reward]],
 +
[[Teams]],
 +
[[Unmediated Social Interaction]],
  
 
=== Possible Closure Effects ===
 
=== Possible Closure Effects ===
 +
-
  
 
=== Potentially Conflicting With ===
 
=== Potentially Conflicting With ===
 +
[[Casual Gameplay]]
  
 
== History ==
 
== History ==

Latest revision as of 07:28, 8 April 2022

Choices players need to make that either set their own individual gains against each others or against the gains of a social group they belong to.

Games where players belong to teams, alliances, or other types of groups that are supposed to cooperate can cause problems for those players because they might exist actions that would benefit them individual but harm the larger group. This creates a Social Dilemmas for the players in that even though cooperation would be beneficial in the long run for all involved parties, the players' have the possibility to reaping a shorter term rewards by acting egoistically or betraying the other players.

Examples

Social Dilemmas have been the focus of several board and card games. In The Republic of Rome, players compete against each other to have the largest faction in the Rome, but at the same time have to stop barbarians from invading the empire. In Intrigue and So Long Sucker players do not have to cooperate but they game mechanics force them to entry alliances and pacts to be able to perform actions, and Intrigue is balanced so they are likely to have and break deals later.

Using the pattern

Creating Social Dilemmas consist creating Incompatible Goals that pair Individual Rewards or Penalties against Shared Rewards or Penalties - this often takes the form of Asynchronous Collaborative Actions. These are often combined with Risk/Reward, Imperfect Information, and Delayed Effects to add Tension by postponing or making it more difficult or impossible to notice how other players have acted.

Quite obviously games that are supposed to have Social Dilemmas need to have others populating the social groups; this provides a way to change the relations between players in Multiplayer Games but can also be designed for players by using Factions with Non-Player Characters. There are several well-known basic types of Social Dilemmas: Delayed Reciprocity (see for example Intrigue and So Long Sucker), the Prisoners' Dilemma, and the Tragedy of the Commons.

The Prisoners' Dilemma is the classic example used in game theory and its name comes from the fictional situation of two prisoners accused of conspiring in two crimes, one minor crime for which their guilt can be proven without any confession, and a major crime for which the guilt can be proven only with one or more confessions. The prosecutor gives both prisoners the same deal: if both confess (which can be seen as an example of Betrayal), they both go to jail for five years (a Shared Penalty); if only one of them confesses, he goes free and the other goes to jail for 10 years (a Individual Reward and Individual Penalty respectively). Finally, if both refuse to confess, they both go to jail for one year (also a Shared Penalty). The core of the dilemma is that even though the option where both prisoners refuse to confess is better for them, for each of them there is a risk that the other will confess, and playing it safe by confessing leads to a situation where both prisoners end up in jail for five years. The design of Prisoner's Dilemma is shows how players can be tempted to not accept a certain Shared Penalty for the possibility of an Individual Reward but can also receive an Individual Penalty for misplacing trust in another player. If both confess, they receive a worse Shared Penalty than if they cooperated and this makes the choice one of Risk/Reward. The original Prisoners' Dilemma did not allow communication between the prisoners before making the choice. Allowing Communication Channels complicates the situation, and introduces Negotiation, but the issue of trust and thus the Social Dilemma, still remains.

The Tragedy of the Commons[1] revolves around avoiding Shared Penalties of having Renewable and Shared Resources from being overused and thereby becoming depleted. These Continuous Goals become dilemmas when players either cannot stop each other from consuming the resources or may not notice the consumption. The name stems from the case where a pasture is free to use for all herdsmen of a village but where over-herding would diminish its future capacity.

The construction of the social group that helps define the Social Dilemmas can be done in a couple of different ways. Although the reason for having Shared Penalties can be arbitrary in games having Social Dilemmas as the core gameplay mechanic, in others the use of Teams can lessen the will for egoistic actions. Games where Beat the Leader opportunities appear create ephemeral Social Dilemmas in if one should spend efforts against the current leader which benefits all other players or if one should focus on bettering one's own position and hope others will work against the leader instead. Other social groups may rely on Delayed Reciprocity, e.g. Guilds, and thereby have Social Dilemmas inherent in their structures. By making the Social Dilemmas not resolvable in one step, as in the case of managing Shared Resources, the dilemmas themselves create the basis for social groups as these are needed to handle what in practice are Continuous Goals. For any grouping that can make players have a sense of Loyalty, Social Dilemmas can be added by introducing Internal Rivalry. The Republic of Rome shows how Internal Rivalry can be combined with Mutual Enemies to create Social Dilemmas as well. Another option is combining Internal Rivalry with Mutual Goals.

While Social Dilemmas can work with abstract social groups, as for example a discussion of Tragedy of the Commons concerning fishing rights don't need to provide details about individual fishermen to make sense, providing details about individuals affects by the Social Dilemmas (e.g., by making these individuals as Characters or Non-Player Characters) can make players engage in Perspective Taking and open up for them have more Emotional Engrossment in the Social Dilemmas.

Both Tied Results and Tiebreakers can be used to create Social Dilemmas; Tied Results allows players to have to share Rewards or not be given them at all when ties occur (Las Vegas is an example of this rule but only creates weak Social Dilemmas since the social groups are not explicit). Tiebreakers can in contrast make it impossible to share Rewards or Penalties even when players want to. Which of these two patterns are appropriate for a specific design however depends on the other factors related to the Rewards, Penalties, and how one can win the game.

Diegetic Aspects

Character Alignments can be used to motivate and thematize Social Dilemmas when the agents which are to have these Social Dilemmas are at least partly defined by said Character Alignments.

Interface Aspects

The way players treat Social Dilemmas can be influenced by what type of Social Interaction they can have with each other. This makes it possible to modulate their behavior by providing Communication Channels, hindering Unmediated Social Interaction or having Enforced Player Anonymity.

Narrative Aspects

When Social Dilemmas depict Characters actions rather than players', they can easily become important events in the Narration Structures or Predetermined Story Structures as Character Defining Actions.

Consequences

Social Dilemmas give players a Freedom of Choice to do actions for egoistic or utilitarian reasons - but these may be influenced by Guilting evoked by the relations the players' have to the other players' affected. Since performing some of the actions possible in Social Dilemmas are likely to cause animosity from other players, these situations can create Internal Conflicts and Tension and well as Emotional Engrossment; this is likely to make the player suffering from the Social Dilemma have to choose an explicit Social Role. When players are aware of other players' Social Dilemmas, even if they only potentially are dilemmas, this affects these players' Perceived Chance to Succeed as well as create Risk/Reward situations for them due to Inherent Mistrust. The possibilities for Tension and Inherent Mistrust makes Social Dilemmas problematic to combine with Casual Gameplay. When players resolve Social Dilemmas so they do not directly benefit themselves comparably with others, this may be regarded as examples of Altruistic Actions even when they are actually No-Ops.

When other players are aware of dilemmas and they have Communication Channels to those having the dilemmas, it is quite natural for Negotiation and Social Interaction to occur. This may also support the rise of Cooperation, Dynamic Alliances, and Social Organizations when the Social Dilemmas are not resolved immediately due to being part of Continuous Goals, e.g. managing Shared Resources as in common in the Tragedy of the Commons case.

Betrayal can occur in several ways when Social Dilemmas exist: choosing Individual Rewards over Shared Rewards, making others receive Penalties while avoiding them oneself, or failing to fulfill obligations related to Delayed Reciprocity.

Since Social Dilemmas exists both as part of gameplay and in other situations, providing it in gameplay can quite easily point to similar cases in other contexts and through this Social Dilemmas offers a basis for Critical Gameplay Design.

Relations

Can Instantiate

Altruistic Actions, Betrayal, Critical Gameplay Design, Dynamic Alliances, Emotional Engrossment, Freedom of Choice, Guilting, Inherent Mistrust, Internal Conflicts, Negotiation, Predetermined Story Structures, Risk/Reward, Social Roles, Tension

with Characters

Character Defining Actions

with Communication Channels or Unmediated Social Interaction

Negotiation, Social Interaction

with Continuous Goals and Negotiation

Cooperation, Dynamic Alliances, Social Organizations

Can Modulate

Multiplayer Games, Narration Structures, Perceived Chance to Succeed

Can Be Instantiated By

Asynchronous Collaborative Actions, Beat the Leader, Character Alignments, Collaborative Actions, Delayed Reciprocity, Factions, Guilds, Incompatible Goals, Individual Penalties, Individual Rewards, Shared Penalties, Shared Resources, Shared Rewards, Renewable Resources, Tiebreakers, Tied Results, Tragedy of the Commons

Internal Rivalry together with Loyalty or Mutual Enemies or Mutual Goals

Can Be Modulated By

Communication Channels, Continuous Goals, Delayed Effects, Imperfect Information, No-Ops, Enforced Player Anonymity, Perspective Taking, Risk/Reward, Teams, Unmediated Social Interaction,

Possible Closure Effects

-

Potentially Conflicting With

Casual Gameplay

History

An updated version of the pattern Social Dilemmas that was part of the original collection in the book Patterns in Game Design[2].

References

  1. Hardin, G. (1968). The Tragedy of the Commons. Science, 162,1243-1248.
  2. Björk, S. & Holopainen, J. (2004) Patterns in Game Design. Charles River Media. ISBN1-58450-354-8.